HOW MANY WARS CAN BE FOUGHT IN YEMEN? THE MANY ACTORS INVOLVED MAKE PEACE MORE DIFFICULT
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| "Sana'a, Yemen" by Rod Waddington is licensed with CC BY-SA 2.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/ |
Although it has resurfaced from time to time in the main press headlines, the long conflict in the Republic of Yemen seems to go unnoticed by the international media, particularly in comparison with other clashes stemming from the Arab springs such as the wars in Syria and Libya. However, the confrontation in the far south of the Arabian Peninsula has led to what the United Nations has described as "the world's worst humanitarian crisis".
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| File:Gulf of Aden map.png" by NormanEinstein is licensed with CC BY-SA 3.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0 |
Background.
Yemen's recent history stems from the decolonisation process and its independence from the Ottoman and British empires, which led to the establishment of two states in the extreme southwest of the Arabian Peninsula: the Yemen Arab Republic (in the north, capitalist), with capital in Sana'a and initially aligned with Saudi Arabia; and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (in the south and east, socialist), influenced and supported by the USSR.
In 2011, in the context of the Arab Springs that are spreading throughout North Africa and the Middle East, the strong popular discontent is added to all the fronts opened during the previous decade. The violent repression unleashed by Saleh, despite the mediation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, led to the attack in which he almost lost his life and caused him to flee to Saudi Arabia. Although he would later return, the government has since been taken over by his vice-president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi. Despite the formation of a National Dialogue Conference -an alliance of all the dissatisfied sectors- whose aim was to make recommendations for constitutional reform, it was doomed to failure as the traditional elites imposed themselves on the process. The lack of an agreement between the various factions is taken advantage of in 2014 by the Houthis, who take Sana'a after allying themselves with the overthrown Saleh and arresting President Hadi. They subsequently dissolved Parliament and formed a revolutionary committee to administer the capital and the areas under their control. However, Hadi managed to escape and settle in Aden (on the southern coast), where the Houthis were advancing with the aim of taking over the south of the country as well.
In view of the threat of Ansar Allah taking over the whole territory, Riyadh organised a military coalition to support the legitimate Hadi’s government and contain the Houthi’s advance. This coalition, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and supplied by the US and other Western countries, initially also brought together other countries of the Sunni Muslim world such as Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Sudan and Pakistan, although their respective shares have progressively varied since then, as some have withdrawn completely -such as Morocco and Malaysia- or have been expelled from the coalition -Qatar- or are making a merely symbolic contribution. Since 2015 a war has been waged between the Houthis and Hadi’s legitimate government backed by the coalition, though as time goes by dissent will arise on the government side. Meanwhile, the United States has continued its particular war on terrorism through selective operations such as the one that killed the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in January.
Houthi side
The usually referred to as the Houthi insurgency is actually the so-called "Ansar Allah" movement set up in the 90s by Hussein Badreddin al Houti (who was killed by government forces in 2004), who initially brought together Zaidi Shia from the north under the name of his tribe, although it is claimed that the movement currently also includes northern Sunnis who were dissatisfied with Saleh's despotic management. In this connection, it should be stressed that not all Zaidis are Houthis, and it is not in vain that Saleh himself was also a Zaidi (from the Ahmar tribe), which is why it is indicated that the conflict is not merely sectarian but that there is a very important tribal component. What is more, although for a time the Houthis were allies with Saleh (and his loyal forces, including the Republican Guard), they would end up assassinating him in 2017, a few days after the former president reneged on them in what appeared to be an attempt to return to Saudi Arabia's orbit as a means of regaining power.
Their leitmotif is formed by five maxims ("God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews and victory of Islam") which are graphically depicted in a famous emblem or quasi-flag that can be seen everywhere in their territories. The Houthis thus maintain an anti-corruption, revolutionary and anti-imperialist agenda that has gained them extensive support in the territories they control. Since the beginning of the conflict, they have not limited themselves to defending from the attacks of the coalition, but have repeatedly attacked Saudi territory, even having a very serious impact on various installations of the oil company Aramco in 2019 and 2020. The government and the coalition have accused Iran of providing the Houthis with ballistic missiles, drones and camouflaged weapons through fishing boats. However, some sources point out that in reality the Houthis would not be dependent on Iran for supplies, but would have obtained their weapons from those abandoned by their enemies or on the black market itself. According to these sources, Iran would only be providing technical and financial advice and critical components for its drones. What is more, although politically backed by Tehran, it appears that the movement is not as subordinate to the regime of the ayatollahs as is usually claimed, but that the Houthis act with full independence in their decision making. Not surprisingly, it has been pointed out that as Ansar Allah is a coalition of tribes, certain components of this coalition may not welcome excessive political and religious influence from Tehran.
Government side
Things have changed a lot since the beginning of the conflict on the side of the government recognized by the international community. Thus, what was initially a united front around Hadi -who governs from exile-, sustained by coalition troops -who in turn rely on other local actors- has ended up leading to a "war within a war" between government forces and separatists in the south, as well as the quasi-dissolution (or very significant reduction) of the coalition of countries, in which only its promoter Saudi Arabia seems to remain at present.
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| Stockholm Agreement 2018 - Sweden Government//Ninni Andersson |
After initially managing to keep the Houthis at bay through bombing in the occupied territories and blocking the crucial Al Hudayda port, the fighting seemed to be interrupted by the UN-sponsored Stockholm Accords of 2018; however, the ambiguity of their terms and their repeated violations by both sides left them on paper. Furthermore, as the confrontation progressed, it became clear that it was incapable of providing the conditions for peace or satisfying all those involved in the conflict, as it envisaged only two contenders without the southern separatists or other local groups having had any say in the matter.
Finally, the government side is said to have relied on the party -categorised as Islamist-"Al Islah" (Yemeni Congregation for the Reform), which some consider to be a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen (an aspect that the former, however, denies). Set up in the 1990s in the context of unification, it enjoys broad support in its territories, especially in the east, due to its strong tribal component. However, not everyone in the coalition would have consented to this support. Given its open opposition to the Muslim Brothers, the UAE would not only have been against Al Islah (whom the STC is fighting), but this would have caused friction with Hadi's forces, as it considers that several of its commanders have affinity or links with the Islamist party. Although a priori the Saudis would have the same misgivings about the Islamist party, it has been pointed out that they have been working with them since the beginning of the conflict as they consider them the only viable option for counteracting the Houthis in their areas of influence. However, it has also been pointed out from this same source that this alliance could be at risk, as in mid-November the Council of Senior Scholars, the highest religious body in Saudi Arabia, declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation, the first such serious declaration against the Brotherhood by Riyadh since 2014.
COVID in the midst of a humanitarian disaster
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| PMA/Jonathan Dumont |
Economically, the country has collapsed, officials have not been paid for months and expatriate remittances, which are normally plentiful, have fallen by 70 per cent due to the fall in oil prices. Hyperinflation and the loss of value of the national currency aggravate the situation in a country that is a major importer of food and medicine.
The deep crisis prompted the UN to launch an ambitious Humanitarian Response Plan for 2019, which quantified the resources required to meet the country's needs at 4.19 billion dollars, of which 83 percent was obtained from donor countries, the main contributors being Saudi Arabia, the USA, the United Kingdom and the UAE. However, the numbers for this year are alarmingly much lower, as although the UN had set a target of 2.4 billion, it has so far only received commitments for just over 50 percent of that amount, which is clearly insufficient to address the pandemic and the underlying humanitarian crisis.
Prospective: indefinite blockade or end of conflict?
The multiplicity of actors involved in the Yemeni conflict seems to make Saleh's own statement true, according to which governing Yemen would be "like dancing on snake heads". Indeed, the events of recent years indicate that putting an end to the conflict and satisfying all the parties involved will certainly be a task worthy of the best tightrope walker.
After five years of fighting, the country is in an untenable situation, with several active fronts on which various forces are fighting, but whose alliances are not very clear. All this in a context of deep humanitarian crisis, with hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of displaced persons, aggravated by the disastrous COVID19 pandemic. Not for nothing did UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths state at the beginning of the year that Yemen was “at a critical juncture. The parties to the conflict will either move Yemen towards de-escalation and the resumption of the political process, or, I fear, towards greater violence and suffering that will make the path to the negotiating table more arduous.”
We are currently facing a blockade situation, with a comfortable Houthi side in the occupied territories, for whom time seems to be running in its favour. On the other side is a government -the one considered legitimate by the international community-that has its president in exile, and whose supposed allies -Southern separatists and Al Islah's Islamists, who are clashing with each other- would follow very different agendas. What is more, despite the support of the coalition, it does not appear that it will manage to recover the lost territories effectively.
On the international level, which is undeniable in any analysis of this conflict, Iran's political support for the Houthis, on the one hand, and the development of the motivations pursued by the coalition members, on the other, cannot be ignored. In this connection, it has been pointed out that in recent months the Saudis would be more concerned with guaranteeing stability along their border than with restoring legitimate government, while the UAE would seek to secure its security and geopolitical interests in a key corner to which it could extend its influence.
Can the conflict then be resolved or is Yemen doomed to indefinite chaos? Of course, resolution does not seem close. However, there are some elements that could be key to moving towards a peaceful outcome after five years of fighting.
On the one hand, the solution must aim for the greatest possible consensus, trying to meet the aspirations of all the groups involved. Any agreement that does not take into account all the actors, especially local voices and groups, is bound to fail. To this end, every effort must be made not to repeat the mistakes of 1990 and to learn the lessons of spring 2011, when the whole of Yemeni society came together to confront Saleh’s regime. Thus, the path of the NDC should be taken as an example, avoiding its failure again through a policy of counterbalancing that prevents its appropriation by the local elites, and instead allows the civil society to participate actively in reforming the constitution towards a purely democratic system and sustained economic growth.
Secondly, as in any peace negotiation, there will need to be a significant volume of gestures and concessions from all sides to enable agreements to be adopted. Gestures such as those made last year by both sides, such as the Houthis handing over hostages and the opening up of the port of Hudayda and the airspace of Sana'a airport by the coalition, which are essential to the delivery of humanitarian aid to a population that has been so badly hit. In this connection, it has been reported that Saudi Arabia would be willing to reach a ceasefire with the Houthis if the latter agree to establish a demilitarised containment zone along the entire border between the two countries. On the other hand, the recent agreement reached between Hadi's government and the STC under Saudi Arabia's auspices, aimed at setting up a joint government in which both are represented, with a view to possible negotiations with Ansar Allah, is encouraging. It remains to be seen, however, whether this agreement is lasting and whether the same thing is not happening as in previous attempts.
And finally, as in any other war, the role of the international community, and above all of the United States, may have a fundamental influence on its resolution. Recently, despite President Trump's veto of the Senate's censure of US involvement in the Saudi campaign, Washington has urged all parties to put an end to hostilities through a ceasefire based on concessions of autonomy that satisfy both Houthis and separatists, in exchange for some return to the pre-conflict status quo. US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis himself has called on the parties to continue in a political process that should “set the conditions for [Yemeni factions to] return to traditional areas inside Yemen, and a government that allows for this amount of local autonomy that the Houthis or that southerners want". In addition, it will be essential for the UN and the Security Council to become more involved, leading to a sufficiently concrete and feasible legal framework that meets -even partially- the aspirations of all the actors, particularly the Yemenis’. In this connection, the current Security Council Resolution 2216 is outdated and currently impracticable, as it urged the Houthis to unilaterally abandon their weapons and withdraw from the occupied territories, an aspect that will never be accepted as such by Ansar Allah. The subsequent Stockholm Agreements were also a mere attempt, as in addition to their ambiguity they only envisaged two contenders (Houthis and government), and the rest of the many players mentioned were excluded from any decision. As we have said, a lasting solution must involve all Yemenis in reconciliation, from Houthis to separatists, armed forces, Islamist parties and civil society, as otherwise unresolved claims and grievances could lead to renewed clashes in the not too distant future.
Although we do not dare to predict whether the final agreement will involve unity or separation -through a model of confederation of states or similar that would return the territory to the status it enjoyed prior to unification in 1990-, it seems that, in view of the demands of the actors involved, the agreement will require Sana'a to grant a much greater degree of autonomy to both Houthis in the north and the southern provinces, as well as a growing role for civil society. Only in this way can Yemen make progress towards peace and put an end to almost a decade of instability, conflict, hunger and death. Only in this way can a future be glimpsed for 28 million Yemenis in which no one talks, ever again, about dancing on snake heads.
